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RACIAL PROFILING OF
AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES: STOPPED,
SEARCHED, AND STRIPPED OF
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
FLOYD D. WEATHERSPOON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Every African-American male in this country who drives a
vehicle, or has traveled by bus or plane, either knowingly or
unknowingly has been the victim of racial profiling by law
Indeed, African-American males are
enforcement officials.'
disproportionately targeted, stopped, and searched by law
enforcement officials based on race and gender. Those responsible
for enforcement of public laws view African-American males as
Unfortunately, the American justice system has
criminals.2
*© 2004, Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Professor of Law, Capital University
Law School (Columbus, Ohio). B.S., North Carolina A&T State University,
1974; J.D., Howard University Law School, 1977. I am especially grateful to
my research assistants Victoria Beale, Jenny Maag-Swinerton, Jennifer Jung,
Rasheda Hansard, Mark Hatcher, and Kristi McDaniel. I am also thankful for
Anthornia A. Steele, Interim Dean, Capital University Law School (Columbus,
Ohio) for providing a generous summer stipend to research and write this
Article.
1. A survey of approximately 1700 minorities revealed that fifty-four
percent of the black men surveyed reported they had been victims of racial
profiling. THE WASHINGTON POST, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION & HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN 2001: ATTITUDES, PERCEPTIONS, AND
EXPERIENCES 28, 38 (2001). See also Richard Morin & Michael H. Cottman,
Discrimination's Lingering Sting; Minorities Tell of Profiling Other Bias,
WASH. POST, June 22, 2001, at A01 (noting that a poll of 323 black men by The
Washington Post, Harvard University, and the Kaiser Foundation determined
that "[more than half of all black men report that they have been the victims
of racial profiling by police"). In proposing the End Racial Profiling Act of
2001 to Congress, Representative Conyers stated in part: "Nearly every young
African-American male has been subjected to racial profiling or has a family
member or close friend who has been a victim of this injustice." 145 CONG.
REC. E1037 (2001) (statement of Rep. Conyers). See also Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 134 n.7 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Leslie Casimir et al., Minority Men: We Are Frisk Targets, DAILY
NEWS (New York), Mar. 26, 1999, at 34).
2. Erika L. Johnson, "A Menace to Society" The Use of Criminal Profiles
and Its Effects on Black Males, 38 HOW. L.J. 629, 649-51. See also United
States v. Coleman, 450 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
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condoned, supported, and in some instances encouraged such
actions by law enforcement officials to stop, arrest, prosecute, and
incarcerate African-American males! On the basis of race and
gender, governmental officials have devised a profile of the typical
criminal: black and male."
The term "driving while black" has been used to describe the
practice of law enforcement officials to stop African-American
drivers without probable cause. The practice particularly targets
African-American males.5 African-American males are not only
singled out while driving, but also while schooling,' eating,7
running for political office,8 walking,9 banking, 1° serving as a
3. See Mary Maxwell Thomas, The African-American Male: Common Gap
Converts Justice Into Just Us System, 13 HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 28
(1997).
4. See generally Lowery v. Commonwealth, 388 S.E.2d 265, 266 (Va. Ct.
App. 1990).
5. See generally DAVID A. HARRIS, AMERICAN CIL LIBERTIES UNION,

RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION'S HIGHWAYS (1999) [hereinafter HARRIS,
RACIAL PROFILING]; KENNETH MEEKS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK (2000); David A.
Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black"
Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999) [hereinafter Harris, Stories, Statistics,
and Law]; Katheryn K. Russell, "Driving While Black": CorollaryPhenomena
and CollateralConsequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 717 (1999); Katheryn K. Russell,
Racial Profiling: A Status Report of the Legal, Legislative, and Empirical
Literature, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 61 (2001); Angela Anita Allen-Bell,
Comment, The Birth of The Crime: Driving While Black (DWB), 25 S.U. L.
REV. 195 (1997).

6. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 1999); Brown
v. City of Oneonta, 195 F.3d 111, 111 (2d Cir. 1999); Brown v. City of Oneonta,
106 F.3d 1125, 1127 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating a school official "released a list of
the names and addresses of... black male students to law enforcement
officers who were looking for an armed young black male suspect"). The court
held that the black male students' rights were not violated under the Family
Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1994). Id. at
1133. See also Carolyn Talbert-Johnson, Continuing the Dialogue: The
Overrepresentationof African-American Males in Special Education, in THE
CRISIS OF THE YOUNG AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALE IN THE INNER CITY 70-77

(1999); Judith A. Browne, Racial Profiling in School?, ESSENCE, Jan. 1, 2001,
at 138. See generally TAMMY JOHNSON ET AL., RACIAL PROFILING AND
PUNTSHMENT IN U.S. SCHOOLS: How ZERO TOLERANCE POLICIES AND HIGH
STAKES TESTING SUBVERT ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE AND RACIAL EQUITY (2000)
(collecting essays that suggest that present school policies and procedures may
result in children of color being racially profiled in schools).
7. See McCaleb v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1044 (N.D.
Ill. 1998); Bobbitt v. Rage Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 512, 522 (W.D.N.C. 1998); Jeff
Leeds, Denny's RestaurantsSettle Bias Suits for $54 Million, L.A. TIMES, May
25, 1994, at Al (noting blacks complained of discrimination at the chain);
Golden Corral Vows to Probe Race Bias Charge, NATION'S REST. NEWS, Aug. 9,
2004, at 52.
8. See Gregory Freeman, Are Black Officials Being Unfairly Targeted?, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 7, 1994, at 13D; Jonathan P. Hicks, Ethics
Investigation Focuses on Minorities, Caucus Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003,
at 37; Norma Adams Wade, Coverage of Black Officials Criticized; Group
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juror,1 getting a taxi,1 shopping," and just being black and a
male. 14 The mere fact of being black and male in America is
sufficient cause for governmental and private law enforcement
5
officials to abridge the rights of African-American males. This is

Threatens Boycott of Local Media, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 4, 1993, at
30A.
9. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 45-49 (1999); 147 CONG. REC.
S2270 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold). See Jill Nelson,
Racial ProfilingStarts Early, U.S.A. TODAY, Apr. 27, 2001, at 13A.
10. See Lewis v. Commerce Bank & Trust, No. 03-4218-RDR, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6477, at *1-2 (D. Kan. Mar. 15, 2004).
11. McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108 (Ind. 2004); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
12. In 1999, movie star Danny Glover complained to the New York Taxi
and Limousine Commission, which licenses taxi drivers, that he was
discriminated against in hailing a cab in New York. William J. Gorta, Court
Slips off Glover Cabby Rule, N.Y. POST, May 1, 2002, at 009. Subsequently,
the Commissioner instituted a program called "Operation Refusal," which
permitted a taxi driver's license to be suspended. Id. A District Court
modified the program by requiring a hearing. Id. See also Dan Ackman,
Yellow Cab Drivers Get No Relief, NEWSDAY, Mar. 21, 2001, at A38; Lys v.
N.Y. City Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, No. SCNY7048/00, 2002 WL 338187, at
*1 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Jan. 14, 2002).
13. See Nevin v. Citibank, 107 F. Supp. 2d 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). In Nevin,
an African-American woman alleged that a credit card company, department
store, and the town police engaged in racial profiling. Id. at 337. The court
went on to discuss incidents of racial profiling in retail establishments. Id. at
339 n.4 (citing ABC News 20/20: Under Suspicion, Security Guards Unfairly
Target Black Shoppers (ABC television broadcast, June 8, 1998), available at
1998 WL 5433617). The court also notes that racial profiling by retailers has
been the subject of at least two other lawsuits in that circuit. Id. (citing
Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 96-CV-1500, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5269,
at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1998); Robinson v. Colonie, 878 F. Supp. 387
(N.D.N.Y. 1995)). The court also notes an interesting article by James L.
Fennessy. Id. (citing James L. Fennessy, Comment, New Jersey Law and
Police Response to the Exclusion of Minority Patronsfrom Retail Stores Based
on the Mere Suspicion of Shoplifting, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 549 (1999)
(discussing New Jersey constitutional implications of racial profiling of
shoppers)). See also Regina Austin, A Nation of Thieves: Securing Black
People's Right to Shop and to Sell White America, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 147, 147
(1994); Amanda G. Main, Note, Racial Profiling in Places of Public
Accommodation: Theories of Recovery and Relief, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 289, 291
(2000).
14. For a discussion of how African-American males are negatively treated
because of a combination of their race and gender, see Floyd D. Weatherspoon,
Remedying Employment Discrimination Against African-American Males:
Stereotypical Biases Engender a Case of Race Plus Sex Discrimination, 36
WASHBURN L.J. 23 (1996).
15. The Court in Washington v. Lambert expressed concerns of how general
descriptions of an African-American male suspect can lead to a significant
number of African-Americans being stopped and detained. 98 F.3d 1181, 119091 (9th Cir. 1996). The court stated that "a significant percentage of AfricanAmerican males walking, eating, going to work or to a movie, ball game or
concert, with a friend or relative, might well find themselves subjected to
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not to suggest that law enforcement officers can never consider
race when performing their job. 6 Just the opposite, where a
witness identifies the race and gender of a suspect, it is relevant
evidence to consider in an effort to apprehend a criminal. 7 Racial
profiling, however, involves a pre-disposition held by law
enforcement officers who are members of the majority, to believe
that minorities, and particularly African-American males, are
engaged in criminal activities; therefore, they are stopped and
searched without probable cause or reasonable suspicion."
Racial profiling has been institutionalized into our American
justice system, as well as other systems that disproportionately
exclude, punish, and ostracize African-American males. 9 For
example, racial profiling on the part of governmental officials has
encouraged and, to a certain extent, licensed individuals in the
private sector to devise similar racial profiles based on
stereotypical biases to selectively punish and exclude AfricanAmerican males from employment opportunities. °
This Article focuses on how African-American males have
fallen prey to law enforcement agencies, as they use racial
profiling as a technique to selectively enforce laws and
regulations.2' There is a substantial amount of literature written
similar treatment, at least if they are in a predominately white neighborhood."
Id. at 1191.
16. United States v. DeClerck, No. 02-40072-01/02-RDR, 2003 WL
22077666, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 12, 2003). See also Von Herbert v. City of St.
Clair Shores, No. 02-1063, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 4450, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar.
11, 2003) (Krupansy, J. dissenting). In dissent, Judge Krupansy stated that
"the selection of an African-American suspect for questioning 'because his
clothing, appearance, location, and race coincided with published descriptions'
patently does not comprise 'illegal "racial targeting" or "racial profiling."'" Id.
at *42-43 (citing United States. v. Waldon, 206 F.3d 597, 604 (6th Cir. 2000)).
17. See David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing
the Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment Activity: Description, Yes;
Prediction,No, 73 MISS. L.J. 423, 435 (2003). Cf Deborah A. Ramirez et al.,
Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 World, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1195, 1205 (2003).

18. The United States Department of Justice defines racial profiling as a
practice which
[A]t its core concerns the invidious use of race or ethnicity as a criterion
in conducting stops, searches and other law enforcement investigative
procedures. It is premised on the erroneous assumption that any
particular individual of one race or ethnicity is more likely to engage in
misconduct than any particular individual of another race or ethnicity.
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF
RACE BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1 (2003).

19. Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Devastating Impact of the Justice System
on the Status of African-American Males: An Overview Perspective, 23 CAP. U.
L. REV. 23 (1994).
20. See generally Weatherspoon, supra note 14, at 26.
21. This Article focuses on the use of racial profiling against AfricanAmerican males. This is not to suggest that racial profiling does not occur
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on racial profiling,22 however, few specifically address how AfricanAmerican males, in particular, are disproportionately impacted by
such discriminatory practices.
Part II of this Article describes and substantiates that racial
profiling is used against African-American males to stop and
search. Regardless of their economic status or education, AfricanAmerican males are disproportionately stopped by law
enforcement officials. Part III describes how stereotypical biases
are the primary reasons law enforcement officials engage in racial
profiling against African-American males. Lastly, the assumption
being that all African-American males are engaged in unlawful
activities, Part IV identifies how racial profiling of AfricanAmerican males is used to sanction traffic and airport stops, in
violation of their constitutional rights. Unfortunately, it appears
that the Supreme Court has sanctioned such treatment.
II.

RACIAL PROFILING OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES

African-American males are the primary victims of racial
Moreover, African-American males
profiling in this country."
against other racial groups, e.g., African-American women. For example, see
Anderson v. Cornejo, No. 97 C 7556, 1999 WL 543196, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 22,
1999), where forty-six African-American women alleged that they were
improperly targeted and searched by the United States Customs Service at an
airport when reentering the country after foreign travel. See also Martinez v.
Vill. of Mount Prospect, 92 F. Supp. 2d 780, 781 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (presenting
evidence that police officers were ordered to target Hispanic drivers for traffic
stops); Charu A. Chandrqsekhar, Flying While Brown: Federal Civil Rights
Remedies to Post 9 / 11 Airline Racial Profiling of South Asians, 10 ASIAN L.J.
215 (2003) (suggesting that post-9/11 Arabs and others of Middle Eastern
descent have become targets of racial profiling); David A. Harris, New
Approaches to Ensuring the Legitimacy of Police Conduct: Racial Profiling
Redux, ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 73 (2003) (indicating that Arabs are also
profiled as a result of terrorist attacks against America); Kevin R. Johnson,
The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U.
L.Q. 675, 680 (2000) (describing how racial profiling is used against the LatinAmerican community); Jennifer Loven, Study FindsBlack Women Singled out
by Customs, THE RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), Apr. 10, 2000, at A9; Phillip
Morris, Racial Profiling Has a New Target, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland,
Ohio), Sept. 25, 2001, at B9 (concluding that Arab-American males have
become targets of profiling as a result of the bombing of the World Trade
Center by terrorists).
22. See generally Jerome H. Kolnick & Abigail Caplovitz, Guns, Drugs, and
Profiling: Ways to Target Guns and Minimize Racial Profiling, 43 ARIZ. L.
REV. 413, 419 (2001); Gregory M. Lipper, Racial Profiling, 38 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 551 (2001); Peter A. Lyle, Racial Profilingand the FourthAmendment:
Applying the Minority Victim Perspective to Ensure EqualProtection Under the
Law, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 243, 247 (2001); Roger Conner & Marvin E.
Johnson, Racial Profiling in America: The Problem and the Challenge, ACR
RESOL. MAG., Fall 2003, at 16.
23. See Suzanne Leone, MassachusettsAddresses Racial ProfilingHead On:
The Advocacy of Chapter228 of The Acts and Resolves of 2000, 28 NEW ENG. J.
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believe they are the primary victims of racial profiling in this
country. For example, surveys conducted by the Washington
Post" and the Black America's Political Action Committee
("BAMPAC") determined that almost fifty percent of AfricanAmerican males surveyed believed they had been victims of racial
profiling.25 The practice of racial profiling is not limited to just
urban areas.
Indeed, it happens wherever African-American
males live, work, or traverse; whether in cities, rural communities,
East or West, North or South, they face closer scrutiny by law
enforcement than white males. 6 Racial profiling of AfricanON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 335, 335 n.4 (2002) (citing a telephone
interview on October 24, 2004 with Kristine Glynn, Legislative Director,
Massachussetts Senate, Office of Senator Dianne Wilkerson:
'This is
something that needs to be talked about,' said Kristine Glynn, Wilkerson's
legislative aid. 'People have called in to report an abnormal amount of traffic
stops for minorities, mostly young black men.'"); Michael A. Fletcher, Driven to
Extremes; Black Men Take Steps to Avoid Police Stops, WASH. POST, Mar. 29,
1996, at A01 (describing how African-American males are targeted for traffic
stops based on stereotypical biases). See also a report entitled Justice On
Trial: Racial Disparities in the American Criminal Justice System, conducted
by the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, which stated that:
In 1992, as part of a report by the ABC news program '20/20,' two cars,
one filled with young black men, the other with young white men,
navigated the same route, in the same car, at the same speed through
Los Angeles streets on successive nights. The car filled with young
black men was stopped by the police several times; the white group was
not stopped once, despite observing police cars in their immediate area
on no less than 16 separate occasions during the evening.
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2, available at
httpJ/www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/cj/justice.pdf (last visited Nov.
10, 2004). See also Blacks Searched More, TELEGRAPH HERALD (Dubuque,
Iowa), May 23, 1996, at b4 (indicating that young minority men driving latemodel cars and carrying pagers or wearing gold jewelry are typically targeted
by police on Interstate 95 in Maryland).
24. See Morin & Cottman, supra note 1.
25. The study determined that approximately forty-six percent of AfricanAmerican males registered to vote believe they had been stopped by law
enforcement officers on the basis of their race. BLACK AM. POLITICAL ACTION
COMM.
("BAMPAC"),
2002 NATIONAL POLL OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN
REGISTERED
VOTERS
(2002),
available
at
http://www.bampac.org/opinion..polls2002.asp?index=16 (last visited Feb. 13,
2005).
See, e.g., Racial Profiling Still Major Problem Among African
Americans; Poll Shows 47 Percent of African American Males Have Been
Profiled, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 6, 2002. Further, the survey by BAMPAC
concluded that of African-American registered voters: "racial profiling affects
college educated men (73%), young men (69% yes) and urban and suburban
men (62%) the most." Memorandum from Black American's Political Action
Committee 6 (July 10, 2002) (on file with author). See also Morin & Cottman,
supra note 1.
26. Incidents of racial profiling of African-American men have been
reported across the Nation. See, e.g., Ann Belser, Suspect; Black Men Are
Subject to Closer Scrutiny from PatrollingPolice, and the Result Is Often More
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American males is not a new phenomenon but a re-packaging of a
twentieth-century form of racial discrimination toward black
males. Justice Marshall said it best when he faced racial profiling
in the 1960s:
[a] white man came up beside me in plain clothes with a great big
pistol on his hip. And he said, "Nigger boy, what are you doing
here?" And I said, "Well I'm waiting for the train to Shreveport."
And he said, "There's only one more train comes through here, and
that's the 4 o'clock, and you'd better be on it27because the sun is
never going down on a live nigger in this town."
At a different time and in a different place, African-American
males were, and remain, singled out for harassment.28
Interestingly, racial profiling is not isolated to just black male
youths in urban areas with a "gangster" or "rapper" appearance or
demeanor.n Racial profiling is applied in a non-discriminatory
manner among African-American males, regardless of their
African-American males who are lawyers, 30
economic status.
3
educators, ' sport figures,' legislators,33 actors,34 news reporters,35
Fear,Antagonism Between Them, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, May 5, 1996, at
supra note 1.
A-15; Casimir et al.,
27. Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth
Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 723 (1992) (alteration in

original).
28. Harris, Stories, Statistics,and Law, supra note 5, at 326.
29. In reviewing various definitions of racial profiling, a report by the
Minnesota House of Representatives determined that a broad definition would
include situations where the "police routinely use race as a factor that, along
with an accumulation of other factors, causes an officer to react with suspicion
and take action." MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESEARCH DEP'T,
RACIAL PROFILING STUDIES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT: ISSUES AND
METHODOLOGY 6 (2000). The broad definition would include young black
males who wear baggy pants, hooded sweatshirts, and/or gold chains. Id.
30. Robert L. Wilkins, an attorney, sued the Maryland State Police for
racial profiling. Larry Bingham, Long and Winding Road: Robert Wilkins
"Driving While Black" Case Began 10 Years Ago and has Hit Yet Another
Snag, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 6,2003, at 1E. Mr. Wilkins and his family were
driving from a funeral in Chicago and were stopped in Maryland. Id. After
Mr. Wilkins refused to consent to a search of his car, a police dog was used to
search. Id. The case was subsequently settled. 'Driving While Black' on
95.... WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1996, at A24.
31. See Elizabeth Benjamin, Traffic Stop Motivated by Race, EducatorSays,
TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), May 22, 2001, at Al (reporting that police
stopped a member of the state Board of Regents because his jeep and his
appearance allegedly matched a suspected armed robber). See also Lambert,
98 F.3d at 1188 (citing examples of how professional African-American males
are stopped and searched by police, including professors).
32. In 1988, baseball hall-of-famer Joe Morgan was stopped and handcuffed
at the Los Angeles airport because the police thought he was a drug dealer.
Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1249 (9th Cir. 1993). A federal judge
later upheld a $540,000 jury award in his favor. Judge Upholds Award Given
to Joe Morgan, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1991, at B2. The court of appeals affirmed
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and business executives36 are stopped, questioned, and humiliated
by law enforcement officers simply because they are black and
male." One-thousand dollar Armani suits do not shield them from
being perceived as drug-dealing thugs. 8
the district court's granting of judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the
plaintiff. Morgan, 997 F.2d at 1262. The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the
award of punitive damages and remanded the case to the district court to
review its decision regarding punitive damages. Id. A similar event occurred
in 1992 when Al Joyner, an Olympic gold medalist, was stopped by police in
West Hollywood and handcuffed under gunpoint. Steve Ballard & Dick
Patrick, Al Joyner Goes to CourtAbout L.A. Traffic Stop, USA TODAY, Oct. 4,
1994, at llC. The police had mistakenly thought he was driving a stolen car.
In L.A., a Case of Mistaken Identity, CHI. TRIB., May 10, 1992, at 3. He was
released, however minutes later he was again stopped by the police who
mistakenly thought he was involved in a hit-and-run accident. Id. The case
was subsequently settled for $245,000. Furthermore, WASH. POST, Feb. 9,
1995, at D02. The following statement by Joyner characterizes the event: "I
had just left the White House with the [P]resident.... No matter how far you
go, I'm still a black man and not a human being." Ballard & Patrick, supra.
Similarly, Shawn Lee, a defensive tackle for the San Diego Chargers was
mistakenly stopped and handcuffed on 1-15 for driving a stolen vehicle.
Marisa Taylor, Ex-ChargerLee, Actress Awarded $249,000 by Jury, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Mar. 14, 2001, at B-1. Interestingly, the vehicle reported stolen
and the car he was driving were not similar; a jury awarded him $249,000 in
damages. Id.
33. See Hope Viner Samborn, Profiledand Pulled over: Lawmakers Propose
New Remedies to Stop Police Abuses, A.B.A. J., October 1999, at 18 (recalling
the story of an African-American male state legislator who was stopped while
driving in a predominantly white neighborhood).
34. John L. Mitchell, 4 Actors Allege Abuse by Police, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13,
1991, at B3. See also Press Release, ACLU-NC, Civil Rights Groups, Minority
Law Enforcement Join in Supporting AB 1264-California "Driving While
Black or Brown" Law (July 24, 1998), at http://www.aclunc.org/pressrel
/980724-dwb.html.
35. In Cape Cod, an African-American male reporter for the Cape Cod
Times was stopped and frisked while interviewing a white individual for a
news story, after a white motorist mistakenly mistook a tape recorder for a
gun at the mouth of a white man. Agents to Investigate Racial Profiling on
Cape Cod, PORTSMOUTH HERALD, May 23, 2000, available at
http://www.seacoastonline.com/2000news/5_23_sb2.htm.
See also Tatsha
Robertson, Editor Says Police Used Racial Profiling, BOSTON GLOBE, May 23,
2000, at B2.
36. White v. Williams, 179 F. Supp. 2d 405, 410 (D.N.J. 2002). In White,
two retired prison guards and a newspaper executive alleged racial profiling in
a class action suit. Id.
37. U.S. Representative John Conyers, sponsor of the Traffic Stops
Statistics Act, has stated: "there are virtually no African-American males,
including Congressmen, actors, athletes, and officer workers, who have not
been stopped at one time or another for an alleged traffic violation, then
harassed with questions and searches." Roger Roy & Henry Pierson Curtis,
Turnpike DrugSquad, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 8, 1997, at Al.
38. For example, see United States v. Jennings, No. 91-5942, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 926, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 1993). In Jennings, an AfricanAmerican male that "'was dressed in conservative business attire'-a grey
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Negative stereotypical biases of African-American males
overshadow any appearances that they are law-abiding citizens.
Indeed, in the eyes of many law enforcement officers, an AfricanAmerican male driving a Mercedes-Benz projects the presumption
of illegal activity, not the presumption of a hard working citizen."
III.

THE IMPACT OF STEREOTYPICAL BIASES TOWARD
AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES

Stereotypical biases directed at African-American males by
law enforcement officials has resulted in a disproportionate
number of African-American males being stopped and searched. '
It is pre-supposed by many law enforcement officials that AfricanAmerican males are engaged in criminal activities, especially drug
dealing. This sentiment by many law enforcement officers became
evident when the New Jersey Chief of Troopers defended racial
profiling by stating that "mostly minorities" were engaged in the
trafficking of marijuana and cocaine. 4' It should be obvious that if
law enforcement agencies focus the enforcement of drug laws
toward African-American males, and ignore whites based on
stereotypical
biases,
African-American
males
will
be
disproportionately stopped and searched. Thus, it will appear they
are the only segment of the country's population engaged in
criminal drug activities." In turn, the data from one jurisdiction

suit, light blue or grey shirt and black shoes"-was stopped and searched at
the Cincinnati airport. Id. at *2.
39. Christopher Darden, a well-known former prosecutor, states: "I always
seem to get pulled over by some cop who is suspicious of a black man driving a
Mercedes." Lambert, 98 F.3d at 1188 (citing CHRISTOPHER A. DARDEN, IN
CONTEMPT 110 (1996)). See also V. Dion Haynes, ACLU, Lawmakers Want
Police to Document Traffic Stops; Proposals Seen as a Way to Substantiate
Minority Drivers' Claims that They Are Routinely Pulled over Because of Their
Race, CI. TRIB., Jan. 1, 1999, at 9N (quoting an executive director of the
National Black Police Association, who indicated that a black person who
drives a BMW, Navigator, or Mercedes may be viewed as selling drugs); Deval
Patrick, Perspective on Civil Rights; Have Americans Forgotten Who They
Are?; We Debate Affirmative Action, but the Larger Issue Is Civil RightsAffirming Our Basic Values as a Nation, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1996, at B5 ("I
still get stopped if I'm driving a nice car in the wrong neighborhood."); Tracie
Reddick, Routine Stops Called Stereotyping, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 18, 1997, at
Metro 1 (describing how black men who drive imported cars are viewed as
being involved in selling drugs).
40. See infra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
41. Debra Dickerson, Policing; Racial Profiling:Are We All Really Equal in
the Eyes of the Law? For the Record, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2000, at M1. In
1999, Governor Christine Todd dismissed Carl Williams, Chief of Troopers, for
making such a discriminatory statement. Id.
42. See Martinez, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 783 (citing Dorothy E. Roberts,
Supreme Court Review: Foreword:Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of
Order-MaintenancePolicing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 818 (1999)
("Targeting Blacks for police surveillance results in higher rates of arrest,
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will be relied on by another to justify the racial profiling of
African-American males; thus, the discriminatory conduct is
perpetuated.
The mere appearance, talk, walk, and dress of AfricanAmerican males are viewed in a negative light by many white
Americans.'
Moreover, African-American males who travel
through white neighborhoods may find themselves stopped and
pulled over by law enforcement officials and investigated." An
African-American male who drives a foreign sports or luxury car is
almost certain to be stopped by law enforcement for suspicion of
drug trafficking or car theft.45 As a result of discriminatory stops,
African-American males are disproportionately arrested by law
enforcement officers. '
Negative images of this group and
stereotypical biases directed at its members may automatically
lead to them being stopped and arrested. 4' Due to such biases, law

reinforcing the presumption of Black criminality. If police stopped and frisked
whites as frequently as they do Blacks, white arrest rates would increase.")).
43. See Nelson, supra note 9. See generally FLOYD D. WEATHERSPOON,
AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1-25 (1998).
44. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 354 n.2 (1983) (noting that an
African-American male was stopped and arrested fifteen times in twenty-two
months while walking near a high crime area); Wilson v. Dep't of Pub. Safety,
No. 02-6236, 2003 WL 21081164, at *1 (10th Cir. May 14, 2003) (stating that
an African-American male alleged that he was stopped because he was "a
black male in a predominately non-minority area during late night"). See also
Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237, 1240-41 (9th Cir. 2000). In Price, two AfricanAmerican males and a white male were stopped as they passed through the
City of Torrance, a predominately white suburb of Los Angeles. Id. at 1241.
The court, in upholding the jury award of $245,000 in compensatory and
punitive damages, stated:
The police officers in this case appear to have chosen the wrong young
people. Two African American teens and a white teen were innocently
driving through the City of Torrance, happily and quietly celebrating
their graduation from prep school. For no good reason, two police
officers stopped their car without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion, conducted an illegal search of the vehicle, and used degrading
and excessive force on the young boys. Such is not an isolated incident
in the Greater Los Angeles area, or across the country. This time,
however, the youngsters had the wherewithal and families with the
legal knowledge and economic resources to seek justice for the wrongs
committed. The defendants received a fair and impartial trial.
Id. at 1256 (citation omitted).
45. Arthur H. Garrison, DisproportionateMinority Arrest: A Note on What
Has Been Said and How It Fits Together, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 29 (1997); Patrick, supra note 39.
See Lowery v.
Commonwealth, 388 S.E.2d 265, 266 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (noting the state
police stopped a rental car from Florida driven by black males). See also
United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109, 113 (6th Cir. 1993) (Delaware state
police stopped a black male driving a late model car).
46. MISSOURI ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT ON
MISSOURI TRAFFIC STOPS 3, 4 (2003).
47. Richard Sutphen et al., The Influence of Juveniles' Race on Police
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enforcement officials assume that every African-American male is
a threat to them, and to society. 48
Racial profiling due to stereotypical biases also has a direct
correlation to the high incarceration rate of African-American
males, 9 especially those between the ages of twenty and thirty
nine. ° Moreover targeting minorities for traffic stops, especially
African-American and Hispanic males,5' may enhance their
sentence for other crimes, if the traffic violation is considered in
determining their penalty.52 Unfortunately, the killing of AfricanAmerican males by law enforcement officials may have a direct
correlation to the percentage of African-Americans being stopped.'
Decision-Making: An Exploratory Study, 44 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 69, 69-70
(1993). See also DARDEN, supra note 39, at 110 ("I always seem to get pulled
over by some cop who is suspicious of a black man driving a Mercedes.').
48. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 639; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896).
49. D.J. Silton, Article, U.S. Prisons and Racial Profiling:A Covertly Racist
Nation Rides a Vicious Cycle, 20 LAW & INEQ. 53, 55 (2002).
50. See ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2001 1, 12

(2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim01.pdf (last
visited Nov. 10, 2004). The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that in 2001
among the 1.9 million or more sentenced inmates approximately 601,800 were
black males between the ages of 20 and 39. Thus, at year end 2001, 13.4% of
black males age 25 to 29 were imprisoned compared with only 4.1% of

Hispanic males and 1.8% of white males in the same age group. Id. at 12 &
tbl. 14.
51. Even though this Article focuses on African-American males, the Latino
community, especially Latino men, are also victims of racial profiling. See
Kevin R. Johnson, The Case for African-American and Latina lo Cooperation
in Challenging Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement, 55 FLA. L. REV. 341
(2003).
52. See Martinez, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 783. The court stated that "targeting
minority civilians for traffic stops distorts the sentences that they receive for
other crimes because many traffic violations 'count' when determining a
convicted defendant's criminal history points." Id. The court then cites, for
example, where a traffic violation may impact future sentences. Id. (citing
United States v. Hernandez, 160 F.3d 661, 669 (11th Cir. 1998); United States
v. Burke, 148 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Boyd, 146 F.3d
499, 502 (7th Cir. 1998)). However, the court, in Martinez, also notes that in
United States v. Leviner, the court decreased the defendant's sentence because
there was evidence that his criminal history points were caused, in part, to
racial disparity in how the police enforced traffic violations. Id. at 783 (citing
United States v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 23, 33 (D. Mass. 1998)). See also
Elizabeth Mehren, Judge Cites Man's Record of "DrivingWhile Black," Eases
His Sentence; Courts: Boston Jurist Says Past Offenses Can Be Traced to
Officers' Habit of Making Traffic Stops Based on Race, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17,
1998, at A34.
53. See Kristina Goetz, Racial Tension in Cincinnati, THE ENQUIRER
(Cincinnati, Ohio), May 19, 2001, available at http://www.enquirer.com
/editions/2001/05/19/locracialtensionin.html; Funeral Followed by Protests,
http'//www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/shooting-protest_010415.ht
ml (Apr. 14, 2001); Cincinnati Mayor Declares State of Emergency,
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SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT

A. Traffic Stops: Driving While Black and Male
More than thirty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry
v. Ohio' placed limitations on the ability of enforcement officers to
stop and search individuals without reasonable suspicion that they
were engaged in criminal activity.55 Reasonable suspicion must be
based on something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or 'hunch. '"'
In addition, the Supreme Court held in
United States v. Sokolow57 that "police conduct carried out solely
on the basis of imprecise stereotypes of what criminals look like, or
on the basis of irreverent personal characteristics such as race"
violates the Fourth Amendment.' Law enforcement officers are
required to have "specific and articuable facts." 9
Even though these limitations are part of the criminal justice
jurisprudence and have been tested repeatedly in court, law
enforcement officers use racial profiling as a means to routinely
stop and search African-American males. ° African-American
males who are stopped and searched will often allege that the
search and seizure violated their Fourth Amendment rights, thus,

http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendly-story/0,3566,6235,00.html (Apr. 13,
2001);
15
Black Males Killed During Arrests Since
1995,
http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendly-story/0,3566,7216,00.html (Apr. 12,
2001).
54. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
The Supreme Court has also held that an
investigatory stop of automobiles constitute seizures within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411
passim (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 passim (1979).
55. Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). But see Amy D. Ronner, Fleeing While Black:
The Fourth Amendment Apartheid, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 383, 400
(2001) (describing how the decision in Terry v. Ohio "is the foundation upon
which the Supreme Court has built its racially biased Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence").
56. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. See also United States v. Ferguson, 130 F. Supp.
2d 560, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (describing how an African-American male's car
was stopped and searched). Ferguson filed a motion to suppress the evidence
collected during the search. Id. In granting the motion, the court held that
stopping the defendant's car based on instincts did not meet the standard
outlined in Terry. Id. at 567-68.
57. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
58. Id. at 12 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 14-15). But see Jodi Sax, Drug
Courier Profiles, Airport Stops and the Inherent Unreasonableness of the
Reasonable Suspicion Standard After United States v. Sokolow, 25 LOY. L.
REV. 321 (1991).
59. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 880 (1975).
60. The Court held in United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp. 332 (D. Colo.
1990), that "profile stops may not be predicated on unconstitutional
discrimination based on race, ethnicity or state of residence." Id. at 339.
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the evidence seized must be suppressed at trial.61 Because the
standard for an investigatory stop does not require probable cause,
but only reasonable suspicion, courts have consistently denied the
suppression of such evidence.62
The use of racial profiling in the selective enforcement of
public laws is most evident in traffic stops by law enforcement
It can also be a most humiliating and frightening
officers.'
experience for anyone, especially African-American males who
may fear imminent harm from police officers.' For example, in
Flowers u. Fiore," an African-American male motorist alleged that
law enforcement officers engaged in racial profiling when he was
stopped, handcuffed, forced to his knees, and had his car
searched.6 According to the police officers, they stopped Flowers
because a resident called the police and stated that he received a

61. See United States v. Bridges, No. 00 CR 210(HB), 2000 WL 1170137, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2000) (discussing how two African-American males
argued that they were unlawfully stopped because they were black males and
denying their request that the evidence seized should be suppressed). See also
Harvey, 16 F.3d at 110-12 (though the officer testified that he stopped the car
because three young black males were occupants in an old vehicle, the court
nevertheless denied the defendant's motions to suppress evidence); Ferguson,
130 F. Supp. 2d at 562-68 (stating why the court granted the motions to
suppress evidence where police officers had stopped an African-American male
who was driving a car with "excessively tinted windows"); State v. Harden,
C.A. Case. No. 19880, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 647, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 13,
2004) (denying the defendant's motion to suppress which was based on the
grounds that the officers did not have specific articulable suspicion that the
defendant was involved in criminal activity, that the traffic stop was merely
pretextual, and that he had been stopped based on racial profiling). See
generally Gregory H. Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: The
Gradual but Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 How. L.J. 567 (1991).
62. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417; Rodriguez v. Cal.
Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
63. For an extensive study of the use of racial profiling in the enforcement
of highway laws see HARRIS, RACIAL PROFILING, supra, note 5. The study also
cites a number of incidents of racial profiling around the country. Most of
these incidents were reported by African-American males.
64. See Wilson v. Tinicum Township, where the plaintiffs, four AfricanAmerican males describe how they were stopped on 1-95 by a Tinicum
Township Police Officer, lined up along the shoulder of the road and searched
by a police dog. No. 92-6617, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9971, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July
22, 1993).
65. 239 F. Supp. 2d 173 (D.R.I. 2003). Recently, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. Flowers v. Fiore, 359 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2004). The appellate court
found that the officers in the case acted reasonably and that their conduct did
Id. at 30.
not constitute an actual arrest requiring probable cause.
Furthermore, the court found that the circumstances, including a threat of
violence, justified the officers' conduct in drawing their weapons and
restraining the defendant before proceeding with their investigation. Id. at
30-32.
66. Flowers, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 176.
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call from someone who purported to be sending over "two black
guys with a gun." 7 Shortly thereafter, the police observed Flowers
driving past the caller's house.' The police stopped him, searched
his car, and then released him because there was no evidence that
he was sent to harm the resident.69
Flowers sued under various federal and state laws, alleging in
part that the police engaged in racial profiling, stopping him in
violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.7 0
The court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment because in the eyes of the court the
search was reasonable.7 The court stated that innocent victims
will be at times subjected to such stops by police officers72 and
suggested that Flowers was entitled to a "good explanation and an
apology."73
The court failed to recognize that too often the
"innocent victims," who were being stopped and humiliated by law
enforcement officers were African-American males.
The court in Washington v. Lambert7" acknowledged the
following: "In this nation, all people have a right to be free from
the terrifying and humiliating experience of being pulled from
their cars at gunpoint, handcuffed, or made to lie face down on the
pavement when insufficient reason for such intrusive police
conduct exists."75 However, too often African-American males are
treated in this manner by law enforcement officials, without
conscious of, or concerns about their constitutional rights.
One of the most egregious examples of racial profiling of
African-American males occurred in 1998 when two New Jersey
Troopers stopped and fired eleven times at a van traveling on the
New Jersey Turnpike, wounding three of the passengers." The
van was occupied by three African-American males and a Hispanic
male, all from New York, who were en route to North Carolina to
try out for a baseball team.77 The shooting brought national
attention to the practice of stopping African-Americans,
particularly African-American males, without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion that they were engaged in a criminal activity.

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 177.
72. Id. at 179.
73. Id.
74. 98 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1996).
75. Id. at 1187.
76. Martin Mbugua & Owen Moritz, N.J. Pays $12.9M Settlement for 4 in
Racial Profiling Case, DAILY NEWS (New York), Feb. 3, 2001, News at 5.
77. See White v. Williams, 179 F. Supp. 2d 405, 412 (D.N.J. 2002)

(describing the turnpike shooting).
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Similarly, in State v. Soto," a superior court judge in
Gloucester County, New Jersey, granted the defendant's motion to
suppress evidence seized after being stopped on the New Jersey
Turnpike.'9 The court held that the seventeen minority defendants
who were African-Americans, the majority of whom were males,
In
established a case of selective enforcement based on race.'
Soto, the defense conducted a study to determine if law
enforcement officers were engaged in racial profiling."' The study
revealed that "an adult black male was present in 88% of the cases
where the gender of all occupants could be determined and that
where gender and age could be determined, a black male 30 or
2
younger was present in 63 of the cases.""
Other examples of racial profiling include an incident
involving the Maryland State Police, which settled a lawsuit
following the discovery of an internal memo that encouraged state
troopers to target African-American males driving east on 1-68.'
The profile of the Maryland State Police suggested that being
black plus male and driving on 1-68 equaled criminal activity.,4
During the past five years, a number of studies support the
conclusion that the race and color of drivers has been the basis for
state law enforcement officers to stop and search cars driven by
African-Americans, particularly African-American males.' One of
the most comprehensive and widely circulated studies on racial
profiling was conducted in 1999 to determine whether the state
police in New Jersey engaged in racial profiling on the New Jersey
The study concluded that minorities were
Turnpike.'
disproportionately stopped and treated differently than white
motorists." Officials of the United States Department of Justice
78. 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996).

79. Id. at 352, 361.
80. Id. at 352.

81. Id. at 356.
82. Id.
83. Haynes, supra note 39. See also Lori Montgomery, Racial Profiling in
Maryland Defies Definition--orSolution, WASH. POST, May 16, 2001, at A01.
84. Robert D. McFadden, Police Singled Out Black Drivers in Drug
Crackdown, Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1996, § 1, at 33.
85. See Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role
for CivilianReview Board, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 551, 559 (1997). See
also Lambert, 98 F.3d at 1187-88 (listing a number of studies which conclude
that "the experience of being stopped by the police is a much more common
one for black men than it is for white men"). For a comprehensive collection of

studies and reports on racial profiling, see the website of the Racial Profiling
Data Collection Resource Center at Northeastern University at
http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
86. NEW JERSEY ATrORNEY GENERAL, INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE

POLICE REVIEW TEAM REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 5

(1999),

available at

http'//www.racialprofllinganalysis.neu.edu/litigation-

display.php?state=NJ (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).
87. See White, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 412-13, for a summary of the study and
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and the State of New Jersey ultimately signed a consent decree to
prohibit and prevent racial profiling by New Jersey State Police.'
Further, a study in Maryland revealed that during a threeyear review of motorists stopped on 1-95, African-Americans
represented seventy percent of individuals stopped by the police,
even though African-Americans make up only about seventeen
percent of motorists.89 A similar study of traffic stops in Missouri
also revealed that African-Americans were disproportionately
stopped and searched.'
Additionally, a study by the Orlando
Sentinel concluded that African-Americans and Hispanics
represented a small percentage of motorists on a particular
Florida highway, however they represented almost seventy
percent of individuals stopped and eighty percent of those whose
cars were actually searched.91 Lastly, in parts of Oklahoma,
African-Americans are disproportionately stopped' and convicted
of traffic violations.93
Similar studies of city law enforcement officials find that
minorities are also disproportionately stopped.' For example, the
Salt Lake Tribune conducted a study of traffic tickets issued by the
Salt Lake City Police Department.95 The survey revealed that
recommendations.
88. Michael Booth, A Report to a Federal Judge, Required by a Consent
Decree Between the State and the Department of Justice, Says New Jersey State
Police are Making Strides in EliminatingRace as a Factor in Traffic Stops,
N.J. L.J., Nov. 6, 2000; Caren Chesler, Whitman Urged to Fight Profiling,
ASHBURY PARK PRESS (New Jersey), Dec. 29, 2000, at 3A.
89. Harris, Stories, Statistics,and Law, supra,note 5, at 267.
90. MISSOURI ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT ON 2001
MISSOURI TRAFFIC STOPS (2001), available at http://www.ago.state.mo.us

/racialprofiling/2001/racialprofiling200l.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
91. Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Color of DriverIs Key to Stops in 1-95 Videos;
The Tapes Show that Most Stops and Searches by Volusia County's Drug
Squad Involve Minorities, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 23, 1992, at Al.
92. See Ziva Branstetter, Minority Stops Show Disparity More Blacks
HispanicsPulled over in Overwhelmingly White Counties, TULSA WORLD, May
20, 2001, at 1 ("More than one-third of those stopped in 11 counties heavily
patrolled by an... [Oklahoma Highway Patrol's] drug interdiction unit were
Black or Hispanic, despite the fact that populations in those areas are
overwhelmingly white. ...")

93. Chuck Ervin, Driving While Black Arrests, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 21,
2000, availableat 2000 WL 6777223.
In northwestern Oklahoma's Major County, where only three black
people live out of a total population of 7,772, according to the U.S.
Census Bureau, Department of Public Safety records show that blacks
received 37 traffic convictions from mid-1996 to mid-1998-a rate of
more than 34 times their proportion of the population.

Id.

94. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. See also infra note 95 and
accompanying text.
95. Shawn Foster, Stats Show Latinos, Blacks More Likely to be Ticketed,
SALT LAKE TRIB., May 10, 1998, at A6. See also a study of traffic stops in
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African-Americans were twice as likely as white drivers to receive
a traffic ticket.6 Another study, conducted by the San Diego Police
Department, revealed that between January and December 2000,
African- and Hispanic-Americans were more likely than whites,
and Asian-Americans to be stopped."
These incidents support the suspicions held by AfricanAmerican males, that their rendezvous with the police have not
occurred by chance, but instead because of the darkness of their
skin and their gender." Police officers may allege there is a

Coconino County, Arizona finding "African[-]American motorists are 2.9 times
more likely to be stopped by DPS officers relative to their representation
within the violator population." Frederic I. Solop, Statistical Analysis of 1-40
Stop Data and 1-40 Violator Study Data From Coconino County, Ariz. 10 (Aug.
http-J/www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu
at
available
2002),
19,
/IRJ_docs/CoconinoStatisticalAnalysis.pdf.
96. Shawn Foster, S.L. Cops Targeting Minority Drivers?; Police
Department Says No, but Analysis of Tickets Says Otherwise; Study Raises
Questions About S.L. Police, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 10, 1998, at Al.
97. See SAN DIEGO POLICE DEP'T, VEHICLE STOP STUDY YEAR END REPORT:
2000 1 (2001), availableat httpJ/www.sannet.gov/police/pdf/stoprpt.pdf.
This report presents analysis of the first year of data, January through
December 2000, representing over 168,000 vehicle stops. The analysis
indicates that both Hispanic and Black/African American drivers are
overrepresented in vehicle stops in comparison to the characteristics of
San Diego's driving-age resident population. Hispanics represent 20.2%
of the city's driving-age population but 29.0% of vehicle stops; the
comparable numbers for Black/African Americans are 8.0% and 11.7%,
respectively. The vehicle stop data also indicate that, once stopped,
Hispanic and Black/African American drivers are substantially more
likely to experience searches and arrests than Asian or White drivers.
While the analysis demonstrates that Hispanic and Black/African
American drivers are overrepresented in vehicle stops in San Diego in
comparison to the driving-age population, and also overrepresented in
subsequent vehicle searches, it does not explain why.
Id.
98. One of the most egregious selective enforcement cases involved George
Murphy, an African-American male, who made the mistake of traveling to
Reynoldsburg, Ohio to meet a friend. See Murphy v. City of Reynoldsburg, No.
90-AP-1296, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 3748, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 8, 1991).
He was followed by a Reynoldsburg police officer who pulled him over a short
distance from his hotel. Id. at *2. After Murphy was arrested and charged
with driving under a suspended license, cocaine was found in the car. Id. at
*2-3. Felony charges were brought against him, but a jury failed to convict
him. Id. at *3. Murphy subsequently brought suit against the city after
learning of an internal investigation of some officers for racial prejudice. Id.
The internal investigation discovered that within the police
at *3.
department, there were groups of white police officers that called themselves
members of SNAT ("Special Nigger Arrest Team"). Id. at *3. Murphy alleged
that the team engaged in selective enforcement against blacks. Id. at *4-5.
After the case was dismissed by a lower court, the Ohio Supreme Court
Murphy v. City of
ordered the lower court to rehear Murphy's case.
Reynoldsburg, 604 N.E.2d 138 (Ohio 1992). The case was subsequently
settled. Fletcher, supra note 23.
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legitimate reason for stopping African-American males, which in
reality is a pretext to discrimination.99 An officer, for example,
may use a state car seat belt law as a pretext to stop AfricanAmerican males who may not use seat belts to the extent of white
motorists. °° Officers also cite the failure to signal when changing
lanes, or following too closely, as a basis for a stop, and ultimately
a search.'0 '
Incidents of racial profiling of African-American men continue
to be reported, as law enforcement officials exercise their authority
to stop and search law-abiding African-American male motorists
in a discriminatory manner.102 This was illustrated in testimony
given by Rossano Gerald, a decorated sergeant of the Gulf War.
Sergeant Gerald testified before a subcommittee of Congress on

99. In Wilson v. Tinicum Township, No. 92-6617, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9971, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 1993), the African-American plaintiffs alleged
that after their car was searched by police dogs and no drugs were found, the
officer stated "in order to make this a legitimate stop, I'm going to give you a
warning for obstruction of your car's rear-view mirror." Id. at * 4. On the
rear-view mirror there was a thin piece of string on which an air fresher had
previously been attached. Id. at *5. One of the plaintiffs asked why they had
been stopped, and according to the plaintiff, the other stated "because you are
young, black and in a high drug-trafficking area, driving a nice car." Id.
100. See Oralandar Brand Williams, Black Motorists Fear More Racial
Profiling; Michigan's New Seat Belt Law, They Believe New Law Will Lead to
Increased Number of Stops, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 9, 2000, at 3A. See also
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not forbid "a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense,
such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine"); Sarah
Oliver, Note & Comment, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista: The Disappearing
Fourth Amendment and It's Impact on Racial Profiling, 23 WHITTIER L. REV.
1099 (2002) (suggesting that the Atwater decision will lead to racial profiling
by police officers who stop and arrest minorities for minor offenses).
101. See Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001) (indicating
that Chavez was given a warning ticket because of an alleged failure to
signal); United States v. Stanley, No. 02-40122-02-SAC, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17973, at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 18, 2003) (citing factors which collectively
can support reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking); United States v.
Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 504 (5th Cir. 2004) (a Texas State Trooper pulled the
car over for allegedly following too closely behind another vehicle). In dissent
in Brigham, Judge DeMoss stated that:
I predict that the holding in this case will lead to further infringement
on the privacy of the traveling public. The majority opinion permits a
law officer to make a traffic stop for a minor and innocuous traffic
violation and then expand that stop into a full-blown investigation of the
driver and all occupants of the vehicle as to where they are going, where
they have been, where they stayed, what they did, whom they talked to,
and what events they attended.
Id. at 520 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
102. In White, three African-American males describe how they were stopped
and humiliated on the New Jersey Turnpike by white troopers. 179 F. Supp.
2d at 411.

20041

Racial Profiling ofAfrican-American Males

Sergeant Gerald
the End of Racial Profiling Act of 2001."
testified how he was handcuffed and humiliated by a State
0
Sergeant
Trooper while driving with his son in Oklahoma.
after he
Patrol
Highway
Oklahoma
the
against
suit
filed
Gerald
°5
was stopped twice in the same day." During the second stop he
was detained for almost two hours while officers searched his car
for drugs."° Finding no drugs, he was given a warning ticket for
'
failure to signal when changing a lane.' The case subsequently
8
settled for $75,000.10
Ironically, there is evidence that the use of racial profiling is
also used by white police officers to stop African-American male
1
police officers who are off-duty. " There is also evidence that
African-American male officers who refuse to engage in racial
0
Even
profiling may also face reprisal, including termination."
more troubling is that there is evidence that the white officers
"pretend" they don't know the African-American male officer, even
though they may have worked together as partners."'
The United States Supreme Court decision in Whren v.
United States"' practically legitimizes the use of racial profiling by
police officers."' In Whren, two African-American males, driving a
103. Prepared Testimony of Master Sergeant Rossano Gerald Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. on the . Constitution, FEDERAL NEWS
SERVICE, Mar. 30, 2000 [hereinafter Master Sergeant Rossano Gerald
Statement]. See also 147 CONG. REC. S5891-92 (2001) (statement of Sen.
Feingold) (describing Sergeant Gerald's testimony given the year before).
104. Master Sergeant Rossano GeraldStatement, supra note 103.
105. Id.

106. Id.
107. Id.

108. Branstetter, supra, note 92, at 1.
109. In a survey conducted by two professors at the University of WisconsinMilwaukee, of 400 African-American police officers of the Milwaukee Police
Department, in which 158 of those officers responded, the officers indicated
that approximately one in three African-American male officers stated that
they had been victims of racial profiling during the past year. Leonard Sykes
Jr. & James H. Burnett, III, The Long Arm of Racial Profiling; Black
Milwaukee Officers Say They Too, Were Victims, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Mar. 24, 2001, at 01B.
110. Bell v. Clackamas County, 341 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2003). An incident in
Providence, Rhode Island exemplifies the ultimate negative result of a law
enforcement officer engaging in racial profiling. An off-duty African-American
male police officer witnessed a confrontation with an armed man, and went to
assist two white police officers. Tina Kelley, Call for Calm After Shooting of
Policeman by Colleagues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, § 1, at 14. The off-duty
African-American male officer was shot and killed by the two white officers.
Id. The two officers stated that they did not recognize the officer who
approached them with his gun drawn. Id.
111. Harris, Stories, Statistics, and Law, supra note 5, at 265-66.
112. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
113. Local enforcement agencies have also developed other indicators for
identifying drug couriers. In Eagle County, Colorado the High County Drug
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dark Pathfinder truck with temporary license plates, were
pursued by plainclothes vice-squad officers after the driver failed
1 14
to give a turning signal and sped off at an "unreasonable" speed.
When the driver stopped at a red light, the officer approached the
driver's door, and observed two large plastic bags of what
appeared to be crack cocaine in the driver's hand.115
Both
individuals were arrested and subsequently charged with violating
various federal drug laws."6
The petitioners challenged the legality of the stop and the
seizure of the drugs. The district court denied the suppression
motion and they were convicted. 1 7 The court of appeals affirmed
the convictions. 18
After reviewing a series of Fourth Amendment cases,119 the
Supreme Court stated:
[Wie think these cases foreclose any argument that the
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual
motivations of the individual officers involved. We of course agree
with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective
enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But
the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory
application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth
Amendment.
Subjective intentions play 120no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.

The Whren decision sanctions law enforcement officers to stop
Task Force developed the following characteristics common to drug couriers:
rental vehicles, vehicles owned by persons not in the vehicle, vehicles
with out-of-state license plates, darkened windows or curtains,
temporary CB antennas, radar detectors, structural modifications,
welding burns, absence of luggage, air fresheners, fast food wrappers on
the floor and loose screws in the trim or lying on the floor.
Whitfield v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 837 F. Supp. 338, 340 (D. Colo. 1993).
114. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.
115. Id. at 809.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The court
of appeals stated that "regardless of whether a police officer subjectively
believes that the occupants of an automobile may be engaging in some other
illegal behavior, a traffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable officer in
the same circumstances could have stopped the car for the suspected traffic
violation." Id. at 375 (citing United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 784 (2d Cir.
1994)).
119. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 811, where the court discussed: New York v.
Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), which upheld the constitutionality of a
warrantless administrative inspection; United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,
462 U.S. 579 (1983); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 101 (1980); and United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), which held that a traffic violation
arrest would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was a "mere pretext for
a narcotics search."
120. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812.
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and question any motorist, ostensibly for an insignificant traffic
violation, and subsequently charge them with other serious
crimes, even though they have no reasonable cause to suspect the
It is irrelevant that the
individual was engaged in a felony.'
"subjective intention"
or
had
motive"
an
"ulterior
officer may have
"
to prove, often
difficult
it
is
though
Even
when making the stop.
biases that an
on
stereotypical
based
is
stop
for
the
the real reason
activities. In
drug
illegal
in
is
engaged
African-American male
3
denying
opinion
a
concurring
in
Griffen,
Judge
State,"
Kearse v.
part:
in
stated
stop,
at
the
seized
evidence
the motions to suppress
For countless African-American and Hispanic drivers, the prospect
of being stopped for a traffic offense and asked to consent to a search
of their vehicles has become part of the preparation for driving....
I hope that police agencies will voluntarily discontinue the "highly
disturbing" practice of suspecting that African-American and
Hispanic motorists are more likely to be drug dealers and couriers
so that their
so as to warrant being stopped for traffic offenses[,]
24
vehicles can be searched and their cash seized.
Often, African-American males who are stopped based on a
"reasonable suspicion" of a traffic violation are lined up along the
cause.121
highway, humiliated, and searched without probable
Such actions should undoubtedly be considered a violation of their
Fourth Amendment rights. 26 Furthermore, if the law enforcement

121. See id. passim. In United States v. Arvizu, the Supreme Court of the

United States recently held that "the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the
officer's action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal
activity 'may be afoot.'" 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citing Sokolow, 490 U.S. at
7). The Arvizu Court stated "when discussing how reviewing courts should
make reasonable-suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that they
must look at the 'totality of the circumstances' of each case to see whether the
detaining officer has a 'particularized and objective basis' for suspecting legal

wrongdoing." Id. (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18). This standard opens the
door for police officers who engage in racial profiling to easily point to an

objective factor for the stop, e.g., not wearing a seat belt.
122. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-14, 818. In Whren, the Court indicated that the
issue of an officer's motivation would be relevant to an Equal Protection
Claim. Id. at 813. See also Hon. Phyllis W. Beck & Patricia A. Daly, State
Constitutional Analysis of Pretext Stops: Racial Profiling and Public Policy
Concerns, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 597 (1999).

123. 986 S.W.2d 423 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999) (noting an African-American male
motorist alleged he was stopped because of his race).
124. Id. at 428.
125. See End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, S.989, 107th Cong. (2001). In

proposing the End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, Congress made the following

finding regarding racial profiling: "Racial profiling harms individuals
subjected to it because they experience fear, anxiety, humiliation, anger,
resentment, and cynicism when they are unjustifiably treated as criminal
suspects." Id.

126. Cf Rodriquez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1140 (N.D.
Cal. 2000). In Rodriquez, the plaintiffs, African-Americans and Latinos,
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officer detains the motorist longer than necessary to determine
whether a traffic violation has occurred, or searches the car
without consent or probable cause, the Fourth Amendment may be
violated." 7
Unfortunately, the Whren decision can be compared with the
Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford.28 The Dred
Scott decision resulted in African-Americans being denied their
constitutional rights as citizens. Even though the cases are more
than a hundred years apart, the impact of Whren on AfricanAmerican males may be the same as Dred Scott. In Dred Scott,
Judge Taney stated that a "[black man] had no rights which the
white man was bound to respect. " " The United States Supreme
Court decision in Whren raises questions of whether AfricanAmerican men have certain constitutional rights.
B. Airport Stops: Drug CourierProfile
The use of drug courier profiling is also used at airports, bus
stations, and with other modes of transportation to stop and
search African-American males.'
As an African-American male
who travels by plane on a frequent basis, I am normally one of
three or four African-Americans on the plane. My personal
observation is that the percentage of airplane travelers that are
African-American is extremely small.'2 ' However, a review of
statistics on African-Americans who are stopped and searched by
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA")
alleged that Patrol Troops had engaged in a pattern and practice of stopping

and ticketing them in violation of their Fourth Amendment Rights. Id. The
court permitted the plaintiff to proceed with a Fourth Amendment claim

because there were allegations that the duration of the search was prolonged
beyond a reasonable time frame. Id.
127. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
128. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

129. Id. at 407.
130. See United States v. Barlow, 310 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that

an African-American male alleged racial profiling when stopped by the DEA

when he purchased two one-way tickets on Amtrack); United States v. Bell, 86

F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating how an African-American male was stopped
and searched while riding his bicycle at night without a headlight); State v.

Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 548 (Minn. 1994) (describing the characteristics of

drug couriers on Amtrak trains); Mark J. Kadish, The Drug CourierProfile:In
Planes, Trains, and Automobiles; and Now in the Jury Box, 46 AM. U. L. REV.
747 (1997). Cf Ronald Sullivan, Judge Finds Bias in Bus Terminal Search,

N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1990, at B3.

131. See United States v. Avery, where the court referred to Travis I, an

earlier case before the court, where it was noted "that airplane passengers
nationwide are estimated at 88% White, 5% African American, and 1%
Hispanic." 137 F.3d 343, 357 n.7 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v.
Travis, 837 F. Supp. 1386, 1390 (E.D. Ky. 1993), affd, 62 F.3d 170 (6th Cir.
1995)). See also Jones v. United States Drug Enforcement Admin., 819 F.
Supp. 698, 714 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
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reveals that African-Americans
The DEA has developed what is
In United States v. Elmore," a
characteristics of a drug courier

are disproportionately stopped." 2
known as "drug courier profiles."33
DEA agent provided the following
plofile:

The seven primary characteristics are: (1) arrival from or departure
to an identified source city; (2) carrying little or no luggage, or large
quantities of empty suitcases; (3) unusual itinerary, such as rapid
turnaround time for a very lengthy airplane trip; (4) use of an alias;
(5) carrying unusually large amounts of currency in the many
thousands of dollars, usually on their person, in briefcases or bags;
(6) purchasing airline tickets with a large amount of small
denomination currency; and (7) unusual nervousness beyond that
ordinarily exhibited by passengers. The secondary characteristics
are (1) the almost exclusive use of public transportation,
particularly taxicabs, in departing from the airport; (2) immediately
making a telephone call after deplaning; (3) leaving a false or
fictitious call-back telephone number with the airline being utilized;
and (4) excessively frequent travel to source or distribution cities.13'

132. United States v. Jennings, No. 91-5942, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 926, at
*1 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 1993). In Jennings, the officer acknowledged that half of
his airport stops involved African-Americans or Hispanic passengers. Id. at
*13.
However, the defendant points out that African-Americans and
Hispanics "comprise far less than fifty percent of the airline passengers." Id.
See also id. at *14 n.3.
133. For a review of the development of the origin of the drug courier profile
see Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier
Profile and Judicial Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L. REV. 843,

847 (1985). See also United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich.
1976) (exemplifying one of the first federal cases involving the drug courier
profile); Stephen E. Hall, A Balancing Approach to the Constitutionality of
Drug CourierProfiles, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 1007, 1009-12 (1993).

134. 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979).
135. Id. at 1039. It appears from previous federal cases that this list is everexpanding. Justice Marshall expressed concern in United States v.Sokolow
that reliance on a profile of drug courier characteristics may subject innocent
individuals to unwarranted police harassment and detention, especially since
the profile has a "chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of
observations." 490 U.S. at 8-9 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall

cited the following cases to illustrate how the profile is forever changing:
United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 803 (6th Cir. 1982) (suspect was

first to deplane), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983), with United States
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564 (1980) (last to deplane), [with] United

States v. Buenventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 29-31 (2d Cir. 1980)
(deplaned from middle); United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 12 (4th
Cir.1980) (one-way tickets) [,] with United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d
594, 595 (6th Cir. 1977) (round-trip tickets)[,J with United States v.
McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 1977) (nonstop flight)[,] with
United States v. Sokolow, 808 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir.) (changed
planes); Craemer,... [555 F.2d at 5951 (no luggage), with United States
v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342, 343 (5th Cir. 1981) (gym bag) cert. denied, 455
U.S. 991 (1982),with Sullivan,... [625 F.2d at 12] (new suitcases);
United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882, 883 (6th Cir. 1978) (traveling
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These characteristics appear to be race-neutral and had race
been listed, it would have raised constitutional concerns (e.g., a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution). 3 '
Courts have consistently held that "the discriminatory
investigation of citizens on the basis of race certainly violates [the
Constitution], engenders distrust of law enforcement officials, and
perpetuates the perception among minority citizens that they are
second-class citizens, and are likely to be suspected of wrongdoing
solely because of their race or ancestry." 137 African-American
males, in particular, view law enforcement officials with suspicion
and distrust. The practice of drug courier profiling of AfricanAmerican men further perpetuates the conflict between AfricanAmerican males and law enforcement officials.
Even though the profile appears to be neutral on its face, the
question still remains whether there are code words within these
"neutral" terms that law enforcement officers interpret and
manipulate to reach African-American travelers, 38 particularly
African-American males.
The enforcement of the "drug courier profile" by law
enforcement officers has resulted in African-American males being
detained, searched, humiliated, and embarrassed while exercising
their constitutional right to travel. 4 °
Based on the
disproportionate number of African-American males stopped, it
appears that the government's profile of a drug courier has become
in practice the black male drug courier profile.'
alone), with United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1219 (5th Cir. 1980)
(traveling with companion); United States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563,
566 (6th Cir. 1979) (acted nervously), cert. denied sub nom. Brooks v.
United States, 444 U.S. 878, (1979), with United States v.
Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 992 (5th Cir.) (acted too calmly), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
Id. at 13-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136. See Allen-Bell, supra note 5 (arguing that the use of drug profiles
violates the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Civil Rights
Act of 1965). Even though the numbers clearly suggest that AfricanAmericans are singled out and stopped based on race in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, proving such allegations is almost impossible as a result of
the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Armstrong, 517
U.S. 456 (1996). In Armstrong, the Court established an insurmountable
evidentiary standard for proving selective enforcement of laws on the basis of
race. See id.
137. Jones, 819 F. Supp. at 723.
138. Local enforcement agencies have also developed other indicators for
identifying drug couriers. See supra note 113.
139. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 629 (finding that black males are the
target of racial profiling).
140. Id. Erika Johnson also finds that the "War on Drugs" has resulted in
black males being disproportionately imprisoned based on the drug courier
profile. Id. See generally Hall, supra note 133.
141. For example, in 1996, it was reported that the North Carolina Highway
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Courts have become suspicious of the use of the drug courier
profile, however, the Court has failed to address the disparity in a
manner to ensure equity in the enforcement of drug laws. For
example, in Jones v. United States Drug Enforcement
Administration, the court stated "[iut is clear from the testimony
that [the] officers approached [the travelers because of their
race]. " 14 Moreover, Jones presented evidence of other incidents
where African-Americans were stopped without probable cause;
however, the court refused to grant Jones's request for injunctive
relief against the DEA."
In United States v. Travis, the evidence clearly supported the
conclusion that airport detectives targeted African-American
travelers by using a race-based profile.'" The evidence presented
by defendants indicated that in 1992, twenty of the twenty-one
individuals arrested at the Kentucky airport were of AfricanAmerican or Hispanic descent.' 5 Even though the court expressed
concerns that African-Americans may be targeted for searches
at
14 6
the airport, it nevertheless upheld the search as being lawful.
Further, in United States v. Weaver,1 7 a DEA agent stopped
an African-American male at the Kansas City International
Airport, because "he was a roughly dressed young black male who
might be a member of a Los Angeles street gang that had been
bringing narcotics into the Kansas City area."" Even with this
evidence, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, nevertheless,
affirmed the district court's decision denying Weaver's motion to
suppress evidence obtained by the government when he was
stopped' 9 In affirming the lower court's decision, the court of
appeals acknowledged that had the decision to stop the AfricanAmerican male been based solely on his race, the Constitution

Patrol's Drug Interdiction Program "stopped and charged black male drivers
at nearly twice the rate of other troopers patrolling those same roads."
DEBORAH RAMIREZ ET AL., NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY, A RESOURCE GUIDE
TO RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS: PROMISING PRACTIVES AND
LESSONS LEARNED 28 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl
/bja/184768.pdf (citing Joseph Neff & Pat Stith, Highway Drug Unit Focuses
on Blacks, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, July 28, 1996, at Al).
142. 819 F. Supp. at 723.
143. Id. at 724. See also Gregory L. Young, The Role of Stereotyping in the
Development and Implementation of the D.E.A. Drug CourierProfiles, 15 LAW
& PSYCH. REV. 331, 335-49 (1991).
144. 837 F. Supp. 1386 passim.
145. Id. at 1391.
146. Id. at 1396. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed

the judgment of the district court. United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170 (6th
Cir. 1995).
147. 955 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1992).
148. Id. at 394.
149. Id. at 396.
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would have been violated. 5 ° The court, however, focused on the
fact that the DEA agent also relied on race-neutral evidence to
stop and question Weaver. 5'
Based on this analysis, law
enforcement officers can easily circumvent the constitutional
rights of African-American males by connecting racial factors with
race-neutral factors in their decision to stop any individual. At the
same time the Eighth Circuit stated that it agreed with the
dissent, "that large groups of our citizens should not be regarded
by law enforcement officers as presumptively criminal based on
race."1 52 Nevertheless, African-American males who travel by
plane or other modes of transportation may automatically be
suspected of engaging in illegal activities solely based on the color
of their skin. Proving that the DEA or other law enforcement
officials are engaged in racial profiling in the enforcement of drug
laws is almost impossible.
The Supreme Court decision in Whren gave law enforcement
officers the authority to stop African-American males, and other
minorities, on the basis of their race, and the Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Armstrong" made it virtually
impossible to prove that law enforcement officers were
intentionally engaged in stopping African-American males.TM For
150. Id. at 394 n.2.
151. Id. at 394 n.2, 395-96.
152. Id. at 394 n.2. The dissent stated, in part that "[olne of the most
disturbing aspects of this case is the agents' reference to Weaver as 'a roughly
dressed young black male.'" Id. at 397 (Arnold, J., dissenting). The dissent
also expressed concern that the "[ulse of race as a factor simply reinforces the
kind of stereotyping that lies behind drug courier profiles. When public
officials begin to regard large groups of citizens as presumptively criminal,
this country is in a perilous situation indeed." Id. (Arnold J., dissenting).
153. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
154. See United States v. Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (D. Kan. 2004).
In Duque-Nava, the court outlined how the Armstrong decision created an
"insurmountable" standard for presenting a selective prosecution claim,
specifically the court stated in part:
In the context of a challenged traffic stop, however, imposing the
similarly situated requirement makes the selective enforcement claim
impossible to prove. It would require the defendant to make a credible
showing that a similarly situated individual was not stopped by the law
enforcement. How could a defendant, without discovery, ever make such
a showing? Would a defendant have to hire an investigator to patrol the
same stretch of highway patrolled by the arresting officer, and then
observe and record other motorists who present probable cause or
reasonable suspicion of violating the same traffic law that was the basis
for stopping the defendant? Even if a defendant accomplished that, how
could a defendant show the other motorist was in fact similarly situated
to the defendant; that the officer had the same opportunity to perceive
and evaluate that motorist's driving as the officer had to perceive and
evaluate the defendant's driving; and that all of the facts and
circumstances that the officer relied on in exercising discretion and
selecting the defendant to stop, were the same facts and circumstances

Racial ProfilingofAfrican-American Males

20041

all practical purposes, Armstrong gave law enforcement officials
unfettered authority to profile, stop, search, and prosecute AfricanAmericans, particularly black males during the "war on drugs." If
there was ever a case where the statistical data clearly supported
a pattern and practice of selective enforcement on the basis of
race, it would have been Armstrong.
In Armstrong, "the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms and the Narcotics Division of Inglewood, California,
Police Department had infiltrated a suspected crack distribution
ring by using three confidential informants."'55 As a result of the
drug sting, Armstrong and other African-American males were
indicted. 5 Defendants filed a motion for discovery or for dismissal
of the indictment alleging that the government had engaged in
selective prosecution on the basis of race.'57 To support their
claim, they submitted an affidavit of an employee of the office of
the Federal Public Defender described as stating:
in every one of the 24 § 841 or § 846 [drug] cases closed by the
office during 1991, the defendant was black. Accompanying the
affidavit was a "study" listing the 24 defendants, their race, whether
they were prosecuted for dealing cocaine as well as crack, and the
status of each case.'5
...

Over objections by the Government the district court granted
the motion for discovery. 9 It ordered the Government:
(1) to provide a list of all cases from the last three years in which the
Government charged both cocaine and firearms offenses, (2) to
identify the race of the defendants in those cases, (3) to identify
what levels of law enforcement were involved in the investigations
of those cases, and (4) to explain its criteria for deciding to
prosecute those defendants for federal cocaine offenses.1'
After appeals to the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to establish the standard for discovery for a
selective prosecution claim. 6'
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the government is
prohibited from using race as a basis to prosecute.'62 From there,

presented with the motorist that the officer did not stop?
Id. at 1154-55.
155. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 458.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See id. at 459.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 461.

162. Id. at 464-65. See also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (holding the
decision to prosecute may not be based on an unjustifiable standard such as

race, religion, or other arbitrary classification); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886).
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the Court established a heightened standard which ties the hands
of defendants from discovering evidence to support their claim of
selective enforcement. The Supreme Court held that to establish a
selective prosecution claim the claimant:
Must demonstrate that the federal prosecutorial policy "had a
discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose." To establish a discriminatory effect in a race case, the
claimant must show that similarly
situated individuals of a different
163
race were not prosecuted.

The Supreme Court also held that this standard even applies
when defendants are seeking discovery to prove their claim.'6 The
difficulty in selection cases is identifying whites who are treated
more favorably by the prosecutor in the enforcement of drug
laws.1" The Court incorrectly hypothesized that the "similarly
situated" standard will not make selective prosecution claims
impossible to prove."
Subsequent selective enforcement cases,
where a discovery motion to discover evidence to support
"similarly situated" whites were treated more favorably, have been
denied based on the Court's decision in Armstrong, thus leaving
defendants, especially African-American male defendants, without
sufficient evidence to support their claim. 67

163. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.
164. See id. at 468. The Court found the time, efforts, and costs that would
be imposed on the government to provide the type of discovery necessary to
support a claim of selective prosecution, justified imposing on that motion for
discovery, the same rigorous standard that is applied to prove a selective
prosecution claim. Id. at 468-69.
165. But see id. at 480 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens notes in
dissent that evidence showing that "black defendants charged with
distribution of crack in the Central District of California are prosecuted in
federal court, whereas members of other races charged with similar offenses
are prosecuted in state court.. . ." Id. There are differences between the
federal scheme as opposed to state schemes, including the "absence of
mandatory minimums, the existence of parole.... lower baseline penalties,
[and that] terms of imprisonment for drug offenses tend to be substantially
lower in state systems than in the federal system." Id. at 479. If a prosecutor
chooses to prosecute a defendant in state court as opposed to federal court,
this could be viewed as more favorable treatment of that defendant. See id. at
478-80.
166. Id. at 466.
167. See United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Kan.
2004); State v. Valencia-Alvarez, No. 02CA0593, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1257
(Colo. Ct. App. July 15, 2004) (holding the defendant could not meet the
burden); Hardy v. Commonwealth, No. 2003-CA-000584-MR, 2004 Ky. App.
LEXIS 145 (Ky. Ct. App. May 21, 2004) (failed to meet standard). But see
People v. Hester, 992 P.2d 569 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (suppressing evidence only
because there was direct evidence that race was a factor in the officers'
stopping the occupants of a car, particularly when one of the officers stated
that he stopped the car "based on the occupants of the vehicle being all black
males").
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The difficulty in meeting the Armstrong standard is
illustrated in United States v. Barlow.'" Barlow, an AfricanAmerican male, was stopped by DEA agents at Chicago's Union
Station after he purchased two one-way tickets to Topeka,
Kansas." 9
The DEA agents indicated that Barlow and his
companion were stopped because they "kept glancing over their
shoulders at the agents and whispering to one another."' 0 After
receiving consent to search their bags, the DEA agents found
drugs and weapons."' Barlow and his companion were arrested.'
In Barlow's motion for discovery under the Armstrong
standard, he alleged that he had been "pursued, stopped,
interviewed,
and
investigated
by
Drug
Enforcement
Administration agents based on his race."'73 Barlow presented
preliminary statistical evidence which indicated that AfricanAmerican males were singled out for stops, whereas white males
were not.'
He requested the names and races of all individuals
stopped by the agents during a five year period.'75 In rejecting his
motion, the court held that allegations of racial profiling are
analyzed under the same standard of complaints of selective
prosecution.' 6
The court stated that "Barlow needed to
demonstrate that the agents' actions had a discriminatory effect
and that the agents had a discriminatory purpose when they
approached him.. . ."'" Without this evidence, Barlow could not
meet the standard in Armstrong to obtain discovery on a claim of
racial profiling. "'
V.

CONCLUSION

African-American males continue to be victims of racial
profiling, even with new safeguards developed by state' 9 and
168. 310 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2002).
169. Id. at 1008.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1009.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1009-10.
175. Id. at 1009.
176. Id. at 1010.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1012.
179. For a review of racial profiling legislation see Memorandum from the
Institute on Race & Poverty, University of Minnesota Law School, to Senator
Linda Berglin (Minn. Legislature), Senator Jane Ranum (Minn. Legislature),
and Representative Greg Gray (Minn. Legislature), Components of Racial
Profiling Legislation (Mar. 5, 2001), available at http://www.umn.edu
/irp/publications/racialprofiling.html. See also Northeastern University, supra
note 85. For a state by state review of racial profiling legislation, see
Northeastern University, Racial Profiling: The State of the Law, at
http://www.policefoundation.orgtpdf/racialprofiling.pdf (last visited Feb. 14,
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federal"8 law enforcement organizations.
The selective
enforcement is based on stereotypical biases directed at AfricanAmericans by law enforcement officials. Further remedies are
needed to prohibit and punish law enforcement officers engaging
in such discriminatory conduct. 8 '
Unfortunately, AfricanAmerican males lack the political clout to force Congress and other
governmental officials to respond in a meaningful manner to
prohibit the racial profiling of African-American males and other
minorities. Moreover, the courts have failed to safeguard their
constitutional rights to travel without fear of being stopped,
searched, and arrested by law enforcement officials on the basis of
their race and gender.
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